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WHAT IS LOST WHEN PHILANTHROPY AVOIDS
PHILANTHROPY LAW?
Benjamin M. Leff*
Professor Dana Brakman Reiser has once again produced work that
invites us all to look at philanthropy and philanthropy law in a fresh way.
In Disruptive Philanthropy: Chan-Zuckerberg, the Limited Liability
Company, and the Millionaire Next Door,1 Professor Reiser provides
what she calls, “the definitive explanation” for a trend in philanthropy:
the “seemingly bizarre choice” by some charitable donors to do
philanthropy using a for-profit vehicle, like a limited liability company,
rather than a traditional non-profit charitable entity, like a private
foundation.2 Professor Reiser uses as her case-study the ChanZuckerberg Initiative (CZI), which was created when the founder of
Facebook and his wife publicly committed 99% of their net worth to
social causes, but notably did not contribute any of it to a private
foundation.3 Professor Reiser explains that Chan and Zuckerberg, and
other philanthropists who have chosen to forego tax-exempt status, have
done so both because they found certain restrictions on tax-exempt
organizations too constraining and because they found the benefits
(especially tax benefits) of contributing to a traditional tax-exempt
organization insufficiently beneficial.4 She argues that this trend is likely
to grow, and increasingly more charitable donors are likely to make use
of the “philanthropy LLC,” thus avoiding any regulatory function that the
current legal regime provides.5
But the key to understanding the philanthropy LLC—at least as
exemplified by CZI—is that it is not so much used as a substitute for
traditional charitable contributions as a delay in making them. While
Professor Reiser does describe some activities of CZI that will never
involve a traditional charity,6 most of what CZI does is choose charitable
recipients and then make contributions to them. In that way, Chan and
Zuckerberg do take advantage of the charitable tax deduction. The
deduction is especially valuable for philanthropists like them because
their wealth consists almost entirely of extremely highly appreciated
stock (in their case, stock in Facebook, the company Zuckerberg
founded). When a donor makes a charitable contribution of appreciated
property, they get a double tax benefit—they avoid paying capital gains
* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.
1. Dana Brakman Reiser, Disruptive Philanthropy: Chan-Zuckerberg, the Limited
Liability Company, and the Millionaire Next Door, 70 FLA. L. REV. 921 (2018).
2. Id. at 921.
3. Id. at 922.
4. Id. at 943, 945
5. Id. at 956–57.
6. Id. at 940–42.
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tax on the appreciation in the stock and they get to deduct the full
appreciated value of the stock.7 This double benefit is one of those tax
perks in the charitable sector that seem almost too good to be true. It
certainly is good enough that Chan and Zuckerberg are making full use
of it. But they are making full use of it over time, rather than all at once.
As Professor Reiser points out, using a philanthropy LLC (rather than
making one’s contributions to a traditional charitable entity all at once)
gives donors “the ability to stage donations to take maximum advantage
of deductibility.”8 In this way, philanthropy LLC is more like a method
for making a charitable pledge (a promise to make contributions in the
future) than it is like a substitute for a traditional charity, but it is even
less binding than a pledge. So long as Chan or Zuckerberg is alive and
want to control their own philanthropy (and manage their own tax
liability), they need not be in any hurry to make irrevocable contributions
to a charity. They can set aside the assets they intend to use for charity at
some point and use them when they choose.
Professor Reiser compares the philanthropy LLC to a traditional
charitable entity that is also used to hold wealth until such time as it will
be deployed in active operating charities—the private foundation.9 In
1969, Congress amended the tax code to provide special treatment for
such entities, concerned that they were being used by philanthropists to
get the benefit of charitable contributions while delaying deploying
wealth actively for charitable purposes.10 Private foundations permit
philanthropists to get the benefit, including the tax benefit, of charitable
contributions before such contributions are deployed for charitable
purposes.11 If philanthropists wanted to wait to get the tax benefit of their
contributions, then they could always wait to create a private foundation,
keeping complete control of their assets until they chose to donate them.
Many major philanthropists in the last century waited until they were
older to create their private foundations, maintaining the flexibility to use
their assets as they saw fit while they were alive and relatively young,
and only committed major portions of their wealth to private foundations
as they thought about transitioning their wealth to the next generation.
When viewed that way, the use of the philanthropy LLC to avoid the
restrictions placed on private foundations seems less stark.
7. Briefing Book: What is the Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions?, TAX POL’Y
CTR. (2016) [hereinafter Briefing Book], https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/whattax-treatment-charitable-contributions [https://perma.cc/4FHD-J4GD].
8. Reiser, supra note 1, at 951.
9. See id. at 931–32.
10. See, e.g., S. COMM. ON FIN., 89TH CONG., TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT ON PRIVATE
FOUNDATIONS 23 (Comm. Print 1965).
11. See I.R.C. § 170 (2018) (outlining the tax benefits awarded to those who give to prviate
foundations); see also Reiser, supra note 1, at 932 (noting how private foundations use their gifs
to enable the efforts of other charitable organizations)
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As Professor Reiser points out, though, the ability to “stage” the tax
benefits of charitable contributions does not last forever.12 When people
as wealthy as Chan and Zuckerberg die, their estates are subject to a
substantial federal estate tax.13 Under current law (2019), a tax of up to
40% is imposed on the value of an estate that exceeds 11.4 million dollars
(22.8 million for a married couple).14 Because the exemption amount is
so high, less than one in a thousand estates will pay federal estate tax,15
but for truly large estates the estate tax can be a significant cost. Assets
contributed to charity avoid the estate tax, even if they are contributed to
a charity under the control of the decedent’s heirs.16 As Professor Reiser
points out:
A private foundation can hold a family's assets through
generations without any application of the estate tax. A
philanthropy LLC cannot function as such a perpetual taxfree vehicle . . . . To avoid the estate tax, those with assets
over the credit amounts will need to transfer their LLC stakes
to exempt entities on death, or pay Uncle Sam his share.17
Therefore, so long as there is an estate tax, philanthropists like Chan
and Zuckerberg have a very strong tax incentive not to continue to hold
assets they plan to use for charity outside of traditional charitable entities
once they both die.
That means that the benefits of the philanthropy LLC will likely last
only a single generation. There is nothing about the philanthropy LLC
that permits Chan and Zuckerberg to avoid the estate tax. So, as long as
the estate tax is not repealed before they die, and as long as their estate is
still substantial when they die, they will have to choose whether to pay
the estate tax or pour their LLC into a private foundation then. In fact,
they almost certainly have already made this decision (at least
preliminarily) in their wills. Life is long and Chan and Zuckerberg are
young; but it’s not that long, and they’re not that young. At the end of
one generation, the difference between a private foundation and a
philanthropy LLC is likely to evaporate for CZI. That means that the most
important question about the philanthropy LLC is whether it creates
12. Reiser, supra note 1, at 955.
13. See I.R.C. § 2001(a) (2018) ("A tax is hereby imposed on the transfer of the taxable
estate of every decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United States.").
14. See What’s New – Estate and Gift Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (June 13, 2019),
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/whats-new-estate-and-gift-tax
[https://perma.cc/F2PJ-8GDX].
15. See Briefing Book, supra note 7.
16. See Frequently Asked Questions on Estate Taxes, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (July 3,
2019),
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/frequently-askedquestions-on-estate-taxes [https://perma.cc/U9MR-WV8C].
17. Reiser, supra note 1, at 955.
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social costs because it facilitates delay of creation of a private foundation
for one generation—not because it facilitates the avoidance of a private
foundation entirely, at least for estates big enough to be subject to the
estate tax, and at least so long as the estate tax is not repealed.
Professor Reiser provides a very balanced presentation of social
benefits and costs of philanthropy LLC. She argues that the rise of
philanthropy LLCs will be beneficial if it increases the amount of money
going to charity, but as compared to private foundations, it might do so
in a way that magnifies certain costs to the general public.18 But thinking
of a philanthropy LLC as only a single-generation strategy casts some of
her analysis in a different light. For example, she argues that the
philanthropy LLC structure magnifies donor control and might insulate
founders from outside influence.19 She contrasts philanthropy LLCs to
large private foundations, which have made major contributions to the
social good in the 20th Century.20 She cites some examples, including the
Ford Foundation’s support for the civil rights movement.21 But the
significant accomplishments she cites have been made by
professionalized private foundations largely in the years after the death
of their founders. As discussed above, the philanthropy LLC structure is
probably most often a single-generation structure, and so should not be
compared to mature, professional, multi-generational private
foundations, like the Ford Foundation. It might be more illuminating to
compare CZI to a private foundation whose founders are still very much
alive, like the Gates Foundation. Do the private foundation rules
effectively limit founder control? Do they effectively prevent founders
from being insulated from outside influence?
More importantly, Professor Reiser points out that the choice of a
philanthropy LLC over a private foundation permits a philanthropist to
avoid an “army of restrictions” on philanthropic activities.22 Again, to the
degree to which this avoidance only lasts a single generation, the choice
might be less socially costly than it might initially appear. To take just
one example, private foundations are subject to the so-called “excess
business holdings” rules, which generally prevent a private foundation
from owning a controlling share in a for-profit company.23 If ChanZuckerberg had contributed Facebook stock (which constitutes the vast
majority of their wealth) to a private foundation, the foundation would
have to divest itself of the vast majority of the stock. The rules operate to
prevent a major shareholder of a company from using a private
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 969.
Id. at 966.
Id. at 936–37.
Id. at 962 n.213.
Id. at 932.
See id. at 933.
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foundation under their control to maintain control over the company. If
they want to maintain control over the company, they must use the stock
they own directly to do that, and the foundation under their control must
divest itself of its stock in the company. In fact, there is a compelling
argument that the concerns that led to the creation of the federal private
foundation restrictions in 1969—exactly those laws that Chan and
Zuckerberg are avoiding with their philanthropy LLC—came almost
entirely out of concerns with dynastic control of philanthropic assets, and
the avoidance of the estate tax that comes from such intergenerational,
dynastic, control.24 I don’t think anyone seriously thinks that founders
should be forced to give up control of the companies they found while
they are alive. The purpose of the excess business holdings rule is
primarily to prevent them from avoiding estate tax and simultaneously
maintaining control for their heirs. There is nothing wrong with
Zuckerberg and Chan choosing not to divest themselves of control of
Facebook while they are both living.
Professor Reiser also points out that the private foundation rules
would restrict the ability of CZI to take a controlling equity interest in
social enterprises they wish to invest in, potentially complicate
investment in social enterprises, complicate (and possibly restrict)
compensation for employees of the organization, and prevent the use of
the organization’s assets for political activities.25 Again, if CZI permits
them to use their own money to do things that they are permitted to do
with their own money, it is not clear why that’s a problem.
Even accepting that CZI is likely to live only until Chan and
Zuckerberg are dead, there may be some very real costs associated with
the use of a philanthropy LLC instead of a private foundation if the form
is widely adopted. First, and most importantly, the single-generational
limit on the philanthropy LLC is dependent on the taxation of
intergenerational transfers. Under current law, some quite large estates
can escape estate taxes, and for those estates a philanthropy LLC might
be a viable philanthropic vehicle for generations. If the philanthropy LLC
is adopted by the “millionaire next door” as Professor Reiser predicts,26
then the LLC may be a useful device to create intergenerational dynastic
control over philanthropic wealth, exactly the situation the private
foundation rules sought to control. Even more worrisome, the legislative
trend appears to be continuing to reduce the number of estates that owe
the estate tax, and there is still a politically powerful movement to
eliminate the estate tax entirely.27 If that were to happen, then the
24. See S. COMM. ON FIN., 89TH CONG., TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT ON PRIVATE
FOUNDATIONS 34 (Comm. Print 1965).
25. Reiser, supra note 1, at 938, 940.
26. Id. at 957.
27. See, e.g., Jeff Stein, Top GOP Senators Propose Repealing Estate Tax, Which is
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philanthropy LLC would cease being a single-generation delay in making
charitable contributions even for estates as large as Chan’s and
Zuckerberg’s, and would become a potentially eternal one, with all of the
social costs that Professor Reiser identifies.
But even when the benefits of a philanthropy LLC are limited to single
generation, there are potential social harms associated with it. In some
ways, it might even be worse than philanthropists simply holding onto
their money until they are ready to make contributions to active charities.
These harms potentially arise because a philanthropy LLC permits
philanthropists to make a claim about their wealth that is different from
simply holding onto it: They are claiming they are doing philanthropy,
even as they maintain complete control over their property. Not only that,
they are creating an entity that holds the “allocated” wealth, appearing as
if they have committed their wealth to charitable purposes without
binding themselves to do so. That raises the question: Is there anything
wrong with that? I think the answer to that is a resounding “maybe.”
The dominant economic theory of nonprofits suggests that thinking
about agency costs will help us evaluate the circumstances in which
avoiding the regulation of charities is likely to be harmful.28 Nonprofit
organizations rely on their structure (and the regulations that enforce it)
to communicate their trustworthiness to various stakeholders. Take as an
illustrative example the most basic difference between a private
foundation and a philanthropic LLC: The foundation has irrevocably
committed its assets to charitable purposes, while the members of an LLC
can change their minds at any time.29 So, in order to understand if it
matters that Chan and Zuckerberg have chosen to make a claim about
their charitable intent without binding themselves to it with the tools
provided in charity law, we need to understand what they are
communicating when they created their philanthropy LLC. Is anyone
relying on that symbolic act in the way they would be if Chan and
Zuckerberg had chosen to make an irrevocable decision? Does it matter
Expected to be Paid by Fewer than 2,000 Americans a Year, WASH.
POST (Jan. 28, 2019, 4:44 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2019/01/28/top-gopsenators-propose-repealing-estate-tax-which-is-expected-be-paid-by-fewer-than-americans-year/
[https://perma.cc/LYQ4-4PTD] (reporting Republican legislative proposals to repeal the federal
estate tax).
28. See generally Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835
(1980) [hereinafter Hansmann, Enterprise] (developing a broad perspective on the economic role
that nonprofit organizations perform); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation
Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Reforming] (discussing the
shortcomings of traditional nonprofit corporation law and proposing a restructure that allows
broader use of corporate statutes); Benjamin Moses Leff, The Case Against For-Profit Charity,
42 SET. HALL L. REV. 819 (2012) (expanding upon agency theory to explain why the government
should provide tax benefits only to nonprofit charitable firms).
29. See Reiser, supra note 1, at 962.
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to the owners of Facebook stock, or to employees of CZI, or to the
charities seeking funds from CZI, or lawmakers, or the potential
beneficiaries of CZI initiatives, or anyone else? If any of these
stakeholders relies on CZI’s “charitable” mission, but CZI is able to
(purposely) avoid the terms of the law that define and constrain a
charitable mission, then those stakeholders may be harmed. More
importantly, if the rise of philanthropy LLCs confuses societal
stakeholders generally about the meaning of charitable entities, and what
rules apply to them, then the whole charitable sector could be harmed by
this confusion. Almost forty years ago, Henry Hansmann posited that the
charitable sector depends for its very existence on the ability of charities
to make credible commitments to stakeholders (like donors) about what
it will and will not do with their charitable assets.30 When stakeholders
are confused about which organizations are charities and which are not,
the ability of the entire charitable sector to make these credible
commitments is diminished, and that in itself could be a harm caused by
philanthropy LLCs.
On the other hand, Professor Reiser does an excellent job of pointing
out that there are numerous benefits as well, and I am as optimistic as she
is about getting wealthy entrepreneurs involved in philanthropy. But it is
important that all stakeholders understand that a philanthropy LLC is not
a charity, while a private foundation (for all its many flaws) is. Luckily,
Professor Reiser is around to explain that important fact so clearly.

30. Hansmann, Enterprise, supra note 28, at 844.

